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trial court and jury witnessed both films, which clearly demon-
strated that petitioner had lied to his models and that he did 
in fact photograph their private parts. The above related evi-
dence considered in the light of petitioner's profession would 
plainly support a conclusion by the jury that he produced and 
possessed these films with intention to distribute and exhibit 
them. It follows that petitioner has failed to' discharge his 
burden on this collateral attack on the judgment of conviction, 
and that the writ of habeas corpus which he seeks should be 
denied. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 9902. In Bank. July 7, 1966.] 
In re CHAHLES ISADORO ROl\IANO on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Punishment-Double Punishment.-Where the 
objective of each burglary of which defendant was convicted 
and sentenced was the commission of a grand theft, of which 
he was also convicted and sentenced, the sentences for grand 
theft, the punishment for which is less tp.an that for burglary, 
must be set aside. 
[2] Id.-Punishment-Double Punishment.-Though two burgla-
ries were committed pursuant to a single conspiracy, defendant 
may be punished for both burglaries where they were separate 
crimes committed at.. different times and places and against 
different victims. 
[3] . Id.-Punishment-Double· Punishment: Conspiracy-Punlsh-
ment.-In a prosecution for conspiracy to commit two thefts 
with charges of three overt acts (two burglaries and possession 
of goods -stolen in the burglaries), defendant could not be 
punished for both the burglaries and the conspiracy unless it. 
had a broader objective than the burglaries and thefts; and 
though evidence of other crimes was introduced, the jury could 
not have found defendant guilty of conspiracy with an objec-
tive broader than that charged under an instruction that evi-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 1475; Am.Jur;2d, Criminal 
Law, § 612. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 1475; [3, 4] 
Criminal Law, § 1475; Conspiracy, § 27; [5] Conspiracy, § 26; [6] 
Habeas Corpus, § 34(5) (e). 
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dence of other crimes could not be considered to prove distinct 
offenses or continual criminality, but only to show identity, 
motive, intent, ability, knowledge, or common scheme. 
[4a, 4b] Id. - Punishment-Double Punishment: Conspiracy-
Punishment.-Where defendant was convicted of and sen-
tenced for- two thefts, conspiracy to commit the thefts, and 
burglaries committed in furtherance of the consp~racy to 
commit the thefts, he could not be punished for both the 
burglaries and the conspiracy, which had no broader objective 
than the burglaries and thefts charged, and the sentences for 
theft and conspiring to commit theft were set aside, since the 
punishment of not more than 10 years for conspiring to 
commit grand theft is less than the punishment of one to 15 
years for second degree burglary. 
[5] Conspiracy-Verdict.-In a prosecution for thefts and con-
spiracy to commit thefts, though the jury was not instructed 
to find whether defendant conspired to commit the felony of 
grand theft or the misdemeanor of petty theft, it was clear 
that the jury found defendant guilty of conspiring to commit 
grand theft where he was convicted of the substantive crimes 
of grand theft. 
[6] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Duration of Sentence-
No Relief Prior to Expiration of Legal Term.-Defendant is 
not entitled to release on petition for habeas corpus, though 
his sentences constituting double punishment are set aside, 
where he is held under other valid judgments of conviction. 
PROCEEDING in habeas. corpus to secure release from 
custody after judgments of conviction for burglary, grand 
theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft. Sentences for 
grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft set aside; 
order to show cause dischargedand-writdenied.-- --- . 
Charles Isadoro Romano, in pro. per., and Russell E. Par-
sons, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack K. Weber, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted and sentenced 
in Kern County on one count of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) 
and one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487), the sentences 
to rUn concurrently. He was also convicted and sentenced in 
San Diego County on two counts of burglary, two counts of 
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grand theft, and one count of conspiring to commit theft 
(Pen. Code, § 182). The sentences for grand theft were to run 
concurrently. The sentences for each count of burglary and the 
one count of conspiracy were to run consecutively to each 
other and concurrently with the sentences for grand theft. 1 
Petitioner is also serving a term for a conviction of grand 
theft in Los Angeles County which is not in question here. 
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that he 
is being subjected to multiple punishment for a single act or 
course of criminal conduct in violation of Penal Code section 
654. [1] Since the objective of each burglary of which he 
was convicted and sentenced was the commission of a grand 
theft of which he was also convicted and sentenced, the Attor-
ney General concedes that sentencing petitioner for both grand 
theft and burglary in each case was improper. (People v. 
McFa'rland, 58 Cal.2d 748 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].) 
Since the punishment for grand theft is less than the punish-
ment for burglary, the sentences for grand theft must be set 
aside. (People v. JlcFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762-763.) 
[2] Petitioner also contends that section 654 precludes sen-
tencing him for more than one crime committed in San Diego 
County, on the ground that the two burglaries and the two 
grand thefts were committed pursuant to a single conspiracy. 
In In re Cruz, ante, p. 178 [49 Cal. Rptr. 289, 410 P.2d 
825], we held that two otherwise separate crimes could each be 
punished, even though they were both committed pursuant to 
one conspiracy. We also held that a defendant cannot be 
punished for both a substantive offense and a conspiracy to 
commit it unless the conspiracy had an unlawful objective 
in addition to the commission of the substantive -offense.---
Under these rules petitioner may be punished for both bur-
glaries, for they were separate crimes committed at different 
times and places and against different victims. 
[3, 4a] Three overt acts were charged in the San Diego 
indictment, the two burglaries and possession of the goods 
stolen in the burglaries. These acts were all committed in 
furtherance of the conspiracy to commit the thefts, for whicll 
petitioner cannot be punished in addition to being punished 
for the burglaries. Accordingly, unless the conspiracy }lad Ii 
broader objective than the commission of the burglaries and 
lUnder Penal Code section 669, the sentences for the S~n Diego COUllt! 
offenses run concurrently with the sentences for the Kern County off('ns~ 
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thefts, petitioner cannot be punished for the two burglaries 
and also for the conspiracy. 
The Attorney General contends that the conspiracy had a 
wider scope than the alleged overt acts would indicate and had 
a broader objective than the commission of the two burglaries 
and related thefts of which petitioner was found guilty. He 
contends that the purpose of proving overt acts is not -to show 
the scope of the conspiracy, but merely to show that the crimi-
nal activity went beyond a corrupt agreement. (See People v. 
Saugstad, 203 Cal.App.2d 536, 549-550 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740] ; 
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 [77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 
L.Ed.2d 1356].) In the present case, however, petitioner was 
not charged with a conspiracy having a broader objective than 
the commission of the substantive crimes charged. Although 
evidence of other crimes was introduced, the trial court 
instructed the jury that such evidence could be considered to 
show identity, motive, intent, ability, knowledge, or a common 
scheme only with respect to the crimes charged and that it 
could not be used to prove "distinct offenses or continual 
criminality." (See CALJIC No. 33.) Accordingly, under the 
instructions given, the jury could not have found petitioner 
guilty of a conspiracy having a broader objective than the one 
charged. 
The question remains whether the sentence on the conspir-
acy count or the sentence on one of the burglary counts should 
be set aside. The punishment for conspiracy to commit a 
felony is the same as the punishment for the felony itself. 
(Pen. Code, § 182.) [5] Although the jury was not 
instructed to find whether petitioner conspired to commit the 
- -felony of grand theft or the misdemeanor of petty theft, it is 
clear that it found him guilty of conspiring to commit grand 
theft, for it convicted him of the substantive crimes of grand 
theft. 
[4b] The punishment for conspiring to commit grand theft 
is imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years 
(Pen. Code, § 489), and the punishment for burglary in the 
second degree is imprisonment in the state prison for not less 
than one and not more than 15 years (Pen. Code, § 461). Since 
the punishment for conspiring to commit grand theft is the 
lesser, it must be set aside. 
The sentence for grand theft in Kern County is set aside. 
The sentences for grand theft and the sentence for conspiring 
to commit theft in San Diego County are also set aside. 
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[6] Petitioner is not entitled to release, however, since he is 
held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to 
show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and 
"\Vhite, J.,:II= concurred. 
[Crim. No. 9944. In Bank. July 7, 1966.] 
In re MARGARET LOUISE :McCARTNEY 
on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - Offenses of Different 
Degrees-Conviction of Included Offense: Homicide-Defenses. 
-Defendant's conviction of second degree murder at her first 
trial "Was an acquittal of first degree murder, and her convic-
tion of manslaughter at her second trial was an acquittal of 
second degree murder. 
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Offenses of Different Degrees-Convic-
tion of Included Offense: Homicide - Charging Offense-
Conviction of Included Offenses.-An indictment or informa-
tion charging murder also charges all lesser offenses neces-
sarily included in the crime of murder, including voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 1159); and one who 
has been charged with murder, convicted of manslaughter, and 
had his conviction reversed on appeal, may be retried for man-
slaughter on the original indictment or information. 
[3] Homicide-Limitation of Prosecution.-Where an information 
charging murder was filed before the three-year period had run 
against manslaughter, following the reversal of defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder in the first trial and the 
reversal of her conviction for manslaughter in the second trial, 
she could be tried under the original information for man-
slaughter though the three-year period had then run or she 
could move to have the information amended to reflect that she 
could be convicted of no higher offense than manslaughter. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 311; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st ed 
§ 572). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, 
§ 28; [2] Criminal Law, § 145; Homicide, § 48; [3] Homicide, 
§ 2. 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
